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INTRODUCTION
The world of renewable energy policy we have long known is no
more. For decades, particular types of laws encouraging the use of
renewable energy have dominated. Now, all that is shifting.
Increasingly, jurisdictions are changing the laws they use to
promote renewables—switching from one approach to another—as
they also make their policies more sophisticated, complex,
nuanced, and fluid. At the same time, renewable energy policies
have begun to converge.1 Labels that once distinguished policy
types from each other no long apply, because the boundaries
between them have become too blurred.2 And, both resistance to
*
Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Hugh B. Brown Presidential Endowed
Chair in Law, S.J. Quinney College of Law, University of Utah. I am grateful to Hannah
Wiseman, David Markell, and the Florida State University College of Law for convening the
symposium, Energy Policy and Markets in a Shifting Federal-State Landscape, at which an
early version of this essay was presented. I am also indebted to Kristen van de Biezenbos for
very helpful comments, to Christopher Sanders for research support, and to the staff of the
Journal of Land Use & Environmental Law, particularly Carlton Hamilton, Graham
O’Donnell, and John Vernaglia, for their careful and professional work on my piece. This
research was made possible in part through generous support from the Albert and Elaine
Borchard Fund for Faculty Excellence.
1. See TOBY D. COUTURE ET AL., THE NEXT GENERATION OF RENEWABLE ELECTRICITY
POLICY: HOW RAPID CHANGE IS BREAKING DOWN CONVENTIONAL POLICY CATEGORIES 1
(2015).
2. Id.
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adopting new policies and pressure to alter existing ones continues
to mount.3 The very foundation of renewable energy support—or at
least the historical basis for how policymakers traditionally have
promoted these technologies—has begun to erode.
Perhaps it is too soon to declare the death of traditional
renewable energy policy, in the United States or elsewhere. But it
is clear that the situation policymakers now find themselves in is
markedly different from that of even the recent past. Rather than
simply offering a paean to prior renewable energy policies’ success
in helping remake energy markets,4 then, it is essential to also
stop and take stock—to assess both where renewable energy policy
has been and where it may be going. For, while the current form of
renewable energy policy may not be (quite) dead (just) yet, it is
undeniable that the status quo will not remain.5
This essay offers such a eulogy. Using legal support for
renewables in the U.S. electricity sector as its primary lens, the
essay approaches the changing nature of renewable energy policy
today from three perspectives. First, it puts this change in
historical context, by tracing different eras and phases of
renewable energy policy support. Second, it identifies and
describes key drivers of why the change is taking place. Third, it
explores the scope of possible paths forward for renewable energy
policy.
The essay concludes by suggesting that both policymakers and
the renewable energy industry will do well to accept that change is
coming—and actively seek to manage it—rather than attempting
to simply entrench existing methods for promoting renewables.
The importance of this lesson cannot be overstated, for the
uncertain futures of renewable energy use and renewable energy
policy are intrinsically interlinked. While we cannot know what
the renewable energy policy of the future will be, what is already
clear is that it will not be what it has been in the past. The same,
no doubt, must also be true of society’s overall energy path.
3. See, e.g., Steven Mufson & Tom Hamburger, A Battle Is Looming Over Renewable
Energy, and Fossil Fuel Interests Are Losing, WASH. POST, Apr. 25, 2014, https://www.
washingtonpost.com/business/economy/a-battle-is-looming-over-renewable-energy-andfossil-fuel-interests-are-losing/2014/04/25/24ed78e2-cb23-11e3-a75e-463587891b57_story.
html?utm_term=.bd7116c8feaa.
4. See, e.g., P.D. Lund, Effects of Energy Policies on Industry Expansion in Renewable
Energy, 34 RENEWABLE ENERGY 53 (2009) (documenting the success of Germany’s policies).
5. See, e.g., Lincoln L. Davies & Kirsten Allen, Feed-in Tariffs in Turmoil, 116 W. VA.
L. REV. 937 (2013); Fernando Dias Simoes, When Green Incentives Go Pale: Investment
Arbitration and Renewable Energy Policymaking, 45 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 251, 283
(2017); Andrés Cala, Renewable Energy in Spain Is Taking a Beating, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 8, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/09/business/energy-environment/renewableenergy-in-spain-is-taking-a-beating.html.
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I. THE HISTORICAL ARC OF RENEWABLE ENERGY POLICY
Composing an accurate portrait of renewable energy policy is
difficult. It is difficult for many reasons, not least among them that
today’s renewable energy policy is as rapidly evolving as it is
expansive in scope. Complicating the picture even more, multiple
legitimate perspectives exist for examining the historical arc of
renewable energy policy.
Here, three perspectives take focus: eras of renewable energy
policy according to the policies’ end goals, steps of the policy
according to its emphasis on market alteration, and phases of
renewable energy policy in terms of the implementing
mechanisms’ developmental evolution. In broad strokes, these
trajectories might be seen as developing along parallel tracks and
on generally similar timeframes. Nonetheless, each viewpoint
offers different and important insights into the overall evolution of
renewable energy policy.
A. Eras—End Goals
Felix Mormann has offered the clearest articulation to date of
how renewable energy policy has evolved over time to pursue
different overarching objectives.6 Mormann notes that renewables
policies began by emphasizing efficacy.7 This was necessary,
because there was broad doubt about whether nascent technologies
like renewables could compete in a mature industry like
electricity.8 Once renewables began proving their merit, though,
lawmakers refined their policies to place greater emphasis on
economic efficiency.9 Achieving the same (or better) results at a
lower cost was key, because price is the primary coin of the realm
in electricity markets.10 Finally, and only recently and tentatively,
renewable energy policies have begun to also embody normative
goals of equity.11 This is the holy grail: marrying all three
objectives together into a new version of renewable energy policy

6. See Felix Mormann, Clean Energy Equity, UTAH L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (on
file with author).
7. Id.
8. See DAVID JACOBS, RENEWABLE ENERGY POLICY CONVERGENCE IN THE EU: THE
EVOLUTION OF FEED-IN TARIFFS IN GERMANY, SPAIN AND FRANCE 176–77 (John J. Kirton &
Miranda Schruers eds., Routledge 2016) (2012).
9. Mormann, supra note 6.
10. See New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1 (2002).
11. Mormann, supra note 6.
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that maximizes effectiveness, efficiency, and equity all at once. It
is an aspiration that echoes heavily in the idea of sustainability.12
The long view of U.S. renewables electricity policy broadly
tracks the same historical sweep that Mormann describes from a
global perspective. The United States’ first real shot at promoting
renewables was the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978,
or PURPA.13 But PURPA, as originally adopted, was a blunt tool.
It focused heavily on efficacy. It told utilities that they had to buy
power from eligible renewables facilities, irrespective of whether
they wanted to do so or not (and certainly, they did not).14 Granted,
PURPA included within it an efficiency regulator—the limit that
utilities had to pay only up to their “avoided cost” to renewables
facilities15—but the law left the setting of avoided costs up to
states, and at least some set it high enough that PURPA had a
meaningful effect on the market.16
Fast forward from the 1970s to the 1990s. The clear successor
policy to PURPA is the Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS), which
individual states started adopting in that decade.17 The Renewable
Portfolio Standard, while focused on bringing more renewables
into the market, built its entire architecture around the idea of
efficiency.18 Virtually every state-level RPS measures compliance
in terms of renewable energy credits, or RECs.19 Using RECs
allows utilities to comply with RPSs at the lowest cost. Rather
than having to build its own renewable energy facility, a utility
can simply buy what is effectively a financial instrument, created
by a producer that can supply renewable power at a lower price,
and achieve compliance at a minimum cost for all. RPSs, in short,
aimed to usher in an era of efficiency in U.S. renewable electricity
policy.20

12. See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl, Sustainable Development: A Five-Dimensional Algorithm for
Environmental Law, 18 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 31, 39, 43 (1999).
13. Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2645 (2018)).
14. 18 C.F.R. § 292.303 (2012).
15. Id. § 292.304.
16. RICHARD F. HIRSH, POWER LOSS: THE ORIGINS OF DEREGULATION AND
RESTRUCTURING IN THE AMERICAN ELECTRIC UTILITY SYSTEM 89–100 (1999).
17. See, e.g., Ronald H. Roseneberg, Harmonious Federalism in Support of National
Energy Goals—Increased Wind Renewable Energy, 85 N.D. L. REV. 781, 812–13 (2009).
18. Lincoln L. Davies, Power Forward: The Argument for a National RPS, 42 CONN. L.
REV. 1339, 1394 (2010).
19. Karlynn S. Cory & Blair G. Swezey, Renewable Portfolio Standards in the States:
Balancing Goals and Rules, 20 ELECTRICITY J. 21, 22 (2007).
20. See Davies, supra note 18, at 1360; cf. David Schraub, Renewing Electricity
Competition, 42 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 937 (2015) (arguing that REC markets could be
leveraged to further electricity restructuring).
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Likewise, as is true on the global scale, equity concerns are
only beginning to emerge in U.S. renewables policy. They are,
however, surfacing both increasingly and quite prominently. The
fact that RPSs remained state-based rather than being
nationalized swung heavily on equity concerns.21 Comparatively,
wind- and solar-poor states complained that a national RPS would
penalize them.22 The growing battles over rooftop solar are all
about equity. Non-solar customers assert they are unfairly being
forced to subsidize solar owners; solar users contend that changes
to policy inequitably upset their reasonable expectations when
they chose to buy solar.23 At the regional scale, entire lines of cases
have begun to develop around equitable notions of how system
upgrade costs for moving renewables like wind power should be
allocated among different users, with doctrines like “cost
causation” being resurrected to help parse the dilemma.24
Certainly, such equity concerns are not new. Just as certainly,
they are not going away anytime soon.
B. Steps—Market Development
A parallel way of considering the developmental arc of
renewable energy policy is what Elizabeth Doris has called the
path toward “market saturation.”25 This conceptualization aligns
with the division some scholars have drawn between “technologypush” and “market-pull” policies.26 Doris sees three sequential
steps that policies take toward preparing renewable technologies

21. See David J. Hurlbut, Multistate Decision Making for Renewable Energy and
Transmission: An Overview, 81 U. C OLO. L. REV. 677, 681 (2010).
22. See Davies, supra note 18, at 1342; David B. Spence, The Political Barriers to a
National RPS, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1451, 1470–71 (2010).
23. See Lincoln L. Davies & Sanya Carley, Emerging Shadows in National Solar
Policy? Nevada’s Net Metering Transition in Context, 30 ELECTRICITY J. 33, 35, 40 (2017).
24. See, e.g., Black Oak Energy, LLC v. FERC, 725 F.3d 230, 237–39 (D.C. Cir. 2013);
Ill. Commerce Comm’n v. FERC, 576 F.3d 470, 479–81 (7th Cir. 2009); Midwest ISO
Transmission Owners v. FERC, 373 F.3d 1361, 1368–71 (D.C. Cir. 2004); see also Alexandra
B. Klass, The Electric Grid at a Crossroads: A Regional Approach to Siting Transmission
Lines, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1895 (2015); Ari Peskoe, Easing Jurisdictional Tensions by
Integrating Public Policy into Wholesale Electricity Markets, 38 E NERGY L.J. 1 (2017); David
B. Spence, Naïve Energy Markets, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 973, 1020–23 (2017).
25. ELIZABETH DORIS, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, POLICY BUILDING BLOCKS: HELPING
POLICYMAKERS DETERMINE POLICY STAGING FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF DISTRIBUTED PV
MARKETS 2 (2012); see also Vitaliy A. Krasko & Elizabeth Doris, State Distributed PV
Policies: Can Low Cost (to Government) Policies Have a Market Impact?, 59 ENERGY POL’Y,
172, 173 (2013).
26. Mary Jean Bürer & Rolf Wüstenhagen, Which Renewable Energy Policy Is a
Venture Capitalist’s Best Friend? Empirical Evidence from a Survey of International
Cleantech Investors, 37 ENERGY POL’Y 4997, 4998 (2009).
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for full market saturation.27 At the first step, the policy simply
aims to prepare the market for the technology. It does so by
removing institutional or market access barriers.28 At the second
step, the policy attempts to create a market for the technology. It
does so by addressing investor uncertainty, educating the public,
or addressing public misperceptions about the technology.29 At the
third step, the policy tries to expand the market. It does so by
trying to drive down technology costs.30
While different policy tools often might fit neatly into one of
Doris’ three steps, it is the policies themselves that also evolve
over time—and in so doing, may move from one step to the next in
terms of what they seek to accomplish. There is a strong argument
that state RPSs in the United States, taken in the aggregate,
already have spanned all three of Doris’ steps. When RPSs first
started out, they tended to be quite modest.31 One of the first RPSs
in the United States, for instance, Iowa’s, was remarkably meek in
its aspirations. It asked for utilities in the state to install a mere
105 megawatts (MW) of combined renewables.32 Such a goal might
fairly be characterized as preparing the system for a market that
would more fully develop only later. By contrast, subsequent RPSs
imposed more meaningful mandates, with a spate of laws
targeting twenty percent renewable electricity production by
2020.33 These policies might accurately fall into Doris’ second step
of market creation. Yet, more recent amendments to some RPSs go
even further. California now has set a goal of fifty percent
renewables,34 Vermont has adopted a seventy-five percent target,35
and Hawaii has said it will reach one hundred percent renewable
electricity by 2045.36 If such objectives are not market saturation
itself, there can be no doubt they count as Doris’ third step in
policy evolution—market expansion.

27. DORIS, supra note 25, at 2.
28. Id. at 3.
29. Id. at 3–4.
30. Id. at 4–5.
31. See Lincoln L. Davies, State Renewable Portfolio Standards: Is There a “Race” and
Is It “To the Top”?, 3 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 3, 59 (2012).
32. IOWA CODE §§ 476.41–.50 (2014).
33. See Davies, supra note 31, at 14, 57.
34. S.B. 350, 2015-2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2015); see Cal Pub. Util. Code § 399.30.
35. H.B. 40, 2015-2016 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Vt. 2015); see Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 30,
§§ 8001 et seq.
36. H.B. 623, 28th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2015); see Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 269-92
(2016).
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C. Phases—Policy Evolution
A third way of seeing the trajectory of renewable energy policy
is to look at the approach—or developmental evolution—of its
implementing laws. That is, renewable energy policy tends to go
through different phases over time, with each phase representing a
new developmental stage in the policy’s progression.
In the early years, renewable energy policies tend to expand in
use. At a broad scale, this is a time, then, of policy proliferation.
Different jurisdictions try different approaches and learn from
each other’s experiences. But even more important: more and more
jurisdictions adopt the relevant renewable energy support policy.37
This naturally leads to a second policy phase, wherein the
implementing mechanisms become more complex, complicated,
and sophisticated. This is a stage of reinvention.38 Policies are
refined and reformulated to address problems they did not
originally foresee—and to take into account new concerns that
experience has brought to light. Finally, there is a phase of policy
convergence.39 Policymakers borrow ideas and design features
from one policy and graft them onto others. Cross-pollination is
modus operandi. And thus, policies begin looking more like one
another—reflecting each other in their scope, shape, approach,
design, and effort.40
Support for rooftop solar in the United States largely has
followed this path. In addition to tax credits, the key policy for
promoting U.S. rooftop solar has been net metering.41 These
policies took hold at the state level following the adoption of
PURPA in 1978 and have only grown since then.42 Jurisdiction
after jurisdiction has adopted them, so that now 40 states plus
Washington, D.C. have some form of statewide or utility-specific
net metering rules in place.43 Recently, though, states have
begun revisiting their laws—sometimes keeping them in place,
37. For an example of this phenomenon, see Sanya Carley et al., Adoption,
Reinvention and Amendment of Renewable Portfolio Standards in the American States, 37 J.
PUB. POL’Y 431 (2016).
38. See id.
39. See COUTURE ET AL., supra note 1.
40. See id.
41. See Kevin Karges, Comment, Net Metering: Do Non-Solar Homeowners and Utility
Companies Have a Legitimate Gripe?, 3 ARIZ. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1017, 1019 (2014).
42. Davies & Carley, supra note 23, at 33.
43. See Net Metering, N.C. CLEAN ENERGY TECH. CTR. (Nov. 2017), http://ncsolarcenprod.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/DSIRE_Net_Metering_November
2017.pdf. Arguably, the rapid adoption of net metering was further spurred, in part, by the
Energy Policy Act of 2005’s requirement that all states consider using such rules. Energy
Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 1251, 119 Stat. 594, 962–63.
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sometimes tweaking them just a bit, and sometimes overhauling
them so significantly that they are not considered net metering at
all but something else: “NEM 2.0” or “net billing.”44 This transition
away from “true” net metering to something more like “net billing”
reflects a policy convergence itself—a shift to something more like
what PURPA originally required for larger facilities decades ago,
and that other policies, like Germany’s feed-in tariff regime, have
recently moved toward as well.
II. THE ROOTS OF THE RENEWABLE ENERGY
POLICY REVOLUTION
The fact that U.S. renewable energy policy, or at least core
aspects of it, now exists in the final stages of its developmental
trajectory—whether measured through eras, steps, or phases—
says much. If renewable energy policy has an evolutionary arc, it
has now arrived toward the end of that sweep. The iteration, in
other words, of U.S. renewables policy that has been in place for so
long is now coming to an end.
At the global scale, the trend is even starker. Jurisdictions
across the world have significantly altered their approaches to
supporting renewables in recent years.45 South Korea dropped its
feed-in tariff scheme for a new RPS.46 Great Britain began with an
auction mechanism (called the Non-Fossil Fuel Obligation, or
NFFO), swapped in an RPS policy (its Renewables Obligation, or
RO), and then added feed-in tariffs on top of its RO. Recently,
Great Britain announced that it will effectively come full circle,
transitioning away from that combination in favor of contracts
for difference (CfD) that act basically as an auction.47
44. Davies & Carley, supra note 23, 35–36. Notably, some states that are only now
adopting rooftop solar support policies are also using these new, evolved versions of policy
rather than traditional net metering laws. See N.C. CLEAN ENERGY TECH. CTR. & MEISTER
CONSULTANTS GRP., THE 50 STATES OF SOLAR: 2015 POLICY REVIEW AND Q4 QUARTERLY
REPORT 12, 17–18 (2016) [hereinafter THE 50 STATES OF SOLAR]; see also In re The
Commission’s Investigation of Value and Cost of Distributed Generation, A.C.C. Decision
No. 75859 (Jan. 1, 2017); S.B. 1050, 28th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2015); H.B. 1139, 98th Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2016); La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n Order, Docket No. R-33929 (Dec. 8, 2016).
45. See Lincoln L. Davies et al., Climate Regulation of the Electricity Industry: A
Comparative View from Australia, Great Britain, South Korea, and the United States, 13
S.C. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 109 (2017).
46. Davies & Allen, supra note 5, at 984–92; see also Jonathan Gifford, Korea’s
Cautious Comeback, PV MAGAZINE (Mar. 1, 2013), https://www.pv-magazine.com/magazinearchive/koreas-cautious-comeback_100010400/?tx_ttnews_backCat%_5D=215&cHash=
77adbf15f8bed8a9ab9617cedf0f11c.
47. See Davies et al., supra note 45, at 135–39. For further discussion, see Catherine
Mitchell & Peter Connor, Renewable Energy Policy in the UK 1990-2003, 32 ENERGY POL’Y
1935 (2004); Catherine Mitchell, The England and Wales Non-Fossil Fuel Obligation:
History and Lessons, 25 ANN. REV. ENERGY & ENV’T 285 (2000); Geoffrey Wood & Stephen
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Of course, Germany may be the most pronounced example.
Beginning in the 1990s, that nation gained attention for
propagating what became one of the most popular renewable
energy support policies globally—the feed-in tariff.48 Germany’s
actions in the early stages of this policy were primarily to make its
law stronger, more aggressive, and more broadly applicable.49 As
its policy success mounted, however, the nation continued to
reinvent its policy, making it more nuanced, market-focused, and
less like a traditional feed-in tariff in many ways.50 Eventually,
Germany replaced the very heart of its feed-in tariff scheme with a
more market-oriented approach, only to turn around and swap
that out for a new reverse auction, or tendering, scheme.51
Germany’s story may be the highest profile, but it hardly
stands alone. Multiple other jurisdictions have not only switched
out their renewable energy policies of late, but have also modified
existing schemes so significantly that they effectively have become
something else.52 In general, this is a march toward policies that
rely more on market mechanisms, but it is at the same time an
effort to promote a greater diversity of renewables, by involving a
broader array of market players.53
The result, in turn, is often new versions of longstanding policy
tools that suddenly look as much like alternative devices as they
do their original selves. Feed-in tariffs and RPSs, for instance, long
Dow, What Lessons Have Been Learned in Reforming the Renewables Obligation? An
Analysis of Internal and External Failures in UK Renewable Energy Policy, 39 ENERGY
POL’Y 2228 (2011); B. Woodman & C. Mitchell, Learning from Experience? The Development
of the Renewables Obligation in England and Wales 2002-2010, 39 ENERGY POL’Y 3914
(2011). For more on the move to competitive auctions to support renewables in Europe, see
Pablo del Río & Pedro Linares, Back to the Future? Rethinking Auctions for Renewable
Electricity Support, 35 RENEWABLE & SUSTAINABLE ENERGY REV. 42 (2014); PABLO DEL RÍO
ET AL., IDENTIFICATION OF ALTERNATIVE POLICY OPTIONS TO AUCTIONS FOR RES-E SUPPORT
(2016), http://auresproject.eu/sites/aures.eu/files/media/documents/aures_d6_1_final.pdf.
48. See RANIER HINRICHS-RAHLWES ET AL., Sustainable Energy Policies for Europe:
Towards 100% Renewable Energy, in 6 SUSTAINABLE ENERGY DEV. 1, 4, 30 n.12 (Jochen
Bundschuh ed., 2013); see also Mischa Bechberger & Danyel Reiche, Renewable Energy
Policy in Germany: Pioneering and Exemplary Regulations, 8 ENERGY FOR SUSTAINABLE
DEV. 47, 49 (2004); Volkmar Lauber & Lutz Mez, Three Decades of Renewable Electricity
Policies in Germany, 15 ENERGY & ENV’T 599, 602–04 (2004).
49. HINRICHS-RAHLWES ET AL., supra note 48, at 30.
50. See Davies & Allen, supra note 5, at 942–66.
51. Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz [EEG] [Renewable
Energy Sources Act],
Mar. 29, 2000, BGBL I, at 305, last amended by Art. I Gesetz [G], July 17, 2017, BGBL I at
2532 (Ger.); see also Matthias Lang & Annette Lang, The 2014 German Renewable Energy
Sources Act Revision – From Feed-in Tariffs to Direct Marketing to Competitive Bidding, 33
J. ENERGY & NAT. RES. L. 131 (2015); Joshua S. Hill, Germany Confirms End to Renewable
Energy Feed-in Tariffs, CLEAN TECHNICA (July 12, 2016), https://cleantechnica.com/2016/
07/12/germany-confirms-end-renewable-energy-feed-tariffs/.
52. See COUTURE ET AL., supra note 1, at 25.
53. See id. at 5.
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were seen as competing policy options—binary possibilities for
states wanting to promote renewables.54 Consider, however, the
RPSs now in place in much of the United States. They often
include “tiers” or “bands” of targets for various technologies, give
different values to different kinds of RECs, and impose alternative
compliance penalties that effectively act like a premium payment
for renewable electricity.55 Without expressly saying so, such laws
function, in principle, much like feed-in tariffs. By the same
measure, a modern feed-in tariff that gives producers a marketplus price, limits eligibility based on an overarching (or floating)
end target, and spreads the program’s cost across all ratepayers
arguably has as much in common with a traditional RPS as it does
a standard-issue feed-in tariff. Increasingly, then, the lines
between different renewable energy policy tools are being erased.56
What is causing this phenomenon—the rapid rewriting of
renewable energy support policies and their increasing
convergence? To where can the roots of this new revolution in
renewable energy policy be traced? At least four factors seem
critical: increased use and aggressiveness of renewable energy
policies, falling costs of technologies, growing equity concerns, and
market and system changes required by integrating renewables
facilities.
A. Policy Expansion
There is no question that renewable energy policies are far
more prevalent today than in the past.57 An observer from the
1970s—the time when the fields of energy law and policy were only
beginning to emerge58—would not even recognize the policy
landscape today.
Two key effects flow from this policy expansion. First, the mere
presence of more policies increases the likelihood that differences
among them will emerge, particularly as different jurisdictions
both learn from each other and engage in policy experimentation of
54. See, e.g., KARLYNN CORY ET AL., NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., FEED-IN TARIFF
POLICY: DESIGN, IMPLEMENTATION, AND POLICY INTERACTIONS, 9–11 (2009); Volkmar
Lauber, REFIT and RPS: Options for a Harmonised Community Framework, 32 ENERGY
POL’Y 1405, 1405 (2004); Wilson H. Rickerson et al., If the Shoe FITs: Using Feed-in Tariffs
to Meet U.S. Renewable Electricity Targets, 20 ELECTRICITY J. 73, 83–84 (2007).
55. Ryan Wiser et al., Supporting Solar Power in Renewable Portfolio Standards:
Experience from the United States, 39 ENERGY POL’Y 3894, 3897 (2011).
56. See COUTURE ET AL., supra note 1, at 25.
57. See RENEWABLE ENERGY POLICY NETWORK FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, RENEWABLES
2017 GLOBAL STATUS REPORT 186 (2017).
58. See Don Zillman, Energy Law: Defining a Discipline, 1 J. ENERGY L. & POL’Y 3–6
(1980).
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their own. This tendency should only heighten when the use of a
policy expands over geographic and political scales, which means
that those policies will also encompass a greater diversity of
renewable energy resources, political preferences and needs, and
economic conditions.
Second, greater use of renewable energy policies should expand
renewable energy deployment. The point seems obvious but may
be less so than face value suggests. A large body of literature has
developed assessing the effectiveness, along a variety of measures,
of renewable energy policies.59 The lessons from these studies are
incredibly important, and policymakers would do well to respond
to, and take into account, this new knowledge about how to make
renewable energy laws more efficient, effective, and equitable as
they manage, adapt, and amend their policies over time.60 At the
same time, a corollary is also plain: Many policies in fact have been
effective at encouraging renewables use.61 Thus, while it would be
far too crude to assert a specific linear relationship between the
presence of any renewable energy policy and the deployment of the
targeted technology in that area, it is also true that the growing
use of renewables across the globe seems tied to the expanded use
of policies to promote them.
B. Cost Reduction
The open secret of renewable energy policies is that they are
not supposed to be permanent.62 Fancy labels can be applied to
59. See, e.g., Sanya Carley, State Renewable Energy Electricity Policies: An Empirical
Evaluation of Effectiveness, 37 ENERGY POL’Y 3071 (2009); Fredric C. Menz & Stephan
Vachon, The Effectiveness of Different Policy Regimes for Promoting Wind Power:
Experiences from the States, 34 ENERGY POL’Y 1786 (2006); Gireesh Shrimali et al.,
Evaluating Renewable Portfolio Standards for In-State Renewable Deployment: Accounting
for Policy Heterogeneity, 4 ECON. ENERGY & ENVTL. POL’Y 127 (2015); see also Galen Barbose
et al., A Retrospective Analysis of Benefits and Impacts of U.S. Renewable Portfolio
Standards, 96 ENERGY POL’Y 645 (2016); Erik Paul Johnson, The Cost of Carbon Dioxide
Abatement from State Renewable Portfolio Standards, 36 RES. & ENERGY ECON. 332 (2014).
60. A key lesson of these studies is that policies vary in their level of successfulness,
and policy design matters very much. See, e.g., C.G. Dong, Feed-in Tariff vs. Renewable
Portfolio Standard: An Empirical Test of Their Relative Effectiveness in Promoting Wind
Capacity Development, 42 ENERGY POL’Y 476 (2012); Reinhard Haas et al., A Historical
Review of Promotion Strategies for Electricity from Renewable Energy Sources in EU
Countries, 15 RENEWABLE & SUSTAINABLE ENERGY REV. 1003, 1026 (2011).
61. See, e.g., Haas et al., supra note 60.
62. See Alan Nogee et al., The Projected Impacts of a National Renewable Portfolio
Standard, 20 ELECTRICITY J. 33, 38, 44 (2007); see also, e.g., Lincoln L. Davies, Incentivizing
Renewable Energy Deployment: Renewable Portfolio Standards and Feed-In Tariffs, 1 KLRI
J. L. & LEGIS. 39, 45–56 (2011); Jonathan A. Lesser & Xuejuan Su, Design of an
Economically Efficient Feed-In Tariff Structure for Renewable Energy Development, 36
ENERGY POL’Y 981, 982 (2008).
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this: for instance, designed senescence, the idea that renewable
energy policies have a built-in shelf-life;63 or grid parity, the
concept that the policies are needed until renewables can compete
on an equal footing with other generation technologies.64 Either
way, the same truth holds. The very idea of renewable energy
support policies is to help scale up renewables production and
deployment, in turn driving down their costs—thus making them
competitive.65 It is not to offer a perpetual subsidy.
As renewables laws have done the work they were designed to
do, this message seems to have faded into the background. That
should not be surprising. Energy markets hardly are truly
free, with government intervention influencing their outcomes in
complex and far-reaching ways. Further, given how welldocumented the endowment effect is across policy contexts,66 it
should not be surprising when it takes hold for renewable energy
support as well. Nonetheless, the simultaneous fall of renewable
technology costs as policies to support them have risen explains
much about why those policies have, in turn, become such an
epicenter of political debate.67
Indeed, recent cost reductions in renewables have been
precipitous.68 An obvious result is that policies designed to
63. The phrase is borrowed from the biological and medical fields. See, e.g.,
Mariavaleria Pellicanò et al., Immune Profiling of Alzheimer Patients, 242 J.
NEUROIMMUNOLOGY 52, 55 (2012).
64. Arne Olson & Ryan Jones, Chasing Grid Parity: Understanding the Dynamic
Value of Renewable Energy, 25 ELECTRICITY J. 17, 17 (2012); Chrissy Astbury, How
America’s Solar Energy Policies Should Follow (and Stray) From Germany’s Lead: Working
Towards Market Parity Without Subsidies, 27 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 209 (2017). Both
the terms “grid parity” and “socket parity” are sometimes used to describe disruptive
competition in the electricity sector. “Grid parity” refers to cost competitiveness at the
wholesale level, while “socket parity” refers to cost competitiveness at the residential or
retail level. See Shelly Hagerman et al., Is Rooftop Solar PV at Socket Parity Without
Subsidies?, 89 ENERGY POL’Y 84, 84 (Feb. 2016).
65. E.g., David Zilberman et al., On the Inclusion of Indirect Land Use in Biofuel
Regulations, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 413, 431 (2011); cf. Gershon Feder & Andrew Schmitz,
Learning by Doing and Infant Industry Protection: A Partial Equilibrium Approach, 43 REV.
ECON. STUD. 175, 175 (1976).
66. See, e.g., Brandon Hofmeister, Bridging the Gap: Using Social Psychology to
Design Market Interventions to Overcome the Energy Efficiency Gap in Residential Energy
Markets, 19 SOUTHEASTERN ENVTL. L.J. 1, 19–20 (2010); Daniel Kahneman et al.,
Anomolies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSP.
193, 199 (1991).
67. Davies & Allen, supra note 5, at 998; Adam Wilson, The Future Looks Bright, or
Does It? An Analysis of Solar Energy Law and Policy in the United States, 22 J. ENVTL. &
SUSTAINABILITY L. 333, 356–60 (2016). Another related, relevant factor is that many
renewable energy technologies have become not only less expensive, but also more efficient
in their operation. See id. at 351.
68. See INT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY AGENCY, THE POWER TO CHANGE: SOLAR AND WIND
COST REDUCTION POTENTIAL TO 2025, 18 (2016); see also Silvio Marcacci, Analysis: 50%
Reduction in Cost of Renewable Energy Since 2008, CLEAN TECHNICA (Sept. 11, 2013),

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3209441

Spring, 2018]

EULOGIZING RENEWABLES POLICY

321

support renewables at one price point become obsolete when the
underlying technology’s costs shift downward. Adjustments,
amendments, recalibrations—or entirely different approaches—are
needed. This need is only further exacerbated when a policy seeks
to promote different technologies, precisely because production and
use costs vary by technology.69 Meanwhile, as technology costs fall,
political pressure to modify existing policies only increases, no
doubt in part because the original rationale for the policy has
begun to erode. Cost reductions, in short, do not just make
renewable technologies more competitive. They also drive policy
change in multiple ways.
C. Equity Dislocation
The policy changes spurred on by falling renewable technology
costs inevitably also lead to changes in how costs and benefits are
distributed across the electricity system, across electricity market
participants, and across system users. Those changes, in turn,
further increase pressure for policy change, albeit not necessarily
in a single direction.
The phenomenon has become perhaps best recognized in the
rooftop solar context, but it is hardly limited to that sphere. As
new entrants—say, rooftop solar owners—enter the market,
existing participants—such as investor-owned utilities—see the
risk that their revenues will decline.70 They thus press for changes
to the policies that are encouraging uptake of the disrupting
technology—in the United States, net metering for rooftop solar.71
Their arguments come in many forms and inevitably root
themselves in equity.
For instance: Utilities say they cannot adequately serve all
their customers, because they no longer are recovering all their
costs of maintaining the system; they are shouldering an unfair
burden.72 Or they assert that solar users are receiving an unfair
advantage compared to other customers—a cross-subsidization—
https://cleantechnica.com/2013/09/11/analysis-50-reduction-in-cost-of-renewable-energysince-2008/.
69. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., LEVELIZED COST AND LEVELIZED AVOIDED COST OF
NEW GENERATION RESOURCES IN THE ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2017, at 7–21 (Apr. 2017),
https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/aeo/pdf/electricity_generation.pdf.
70. Elisabeth Graffy & Steven Kihm, Does Disruptive Competition Mean a Death
Spiral for Electric Utilities?, 35 ENERGY L.J. 1 (2014); David Raskin, Getting Distributed
Generation Right: A Response to “Does Disruptive Competition Mean A Death Spiral for
Electric Utilities?”, 35 ENERGY L.J. 263 (2014).
71. See generally Troy A. Rule, Solar Energy, Utilities, and Fairness, 6 SAN DIEGO J.
CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 115 (2015).
72. Id. at 140.
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because those users rely on the grid as a giant battery for their
rooftop solar systems, without paying their full share of the value
they receive from the grid.73
As renewable technology costs decrease, such arguments only
become more powerful. The gap between the cost of traditional and
renewable generation narrows, making policy support less
necessary, and exacerbating equity concerns. Predictably, different
camps devise divergent labels for the trend. Utilities call the
emerging threat of small-scale producers a potential “death
spiral”;74 pro-renewables and distributed generation advocates
herald the possibility of a new “energy democracy.”75 Somewhere in
between, the more neutral moniker of “prosumers”—consumers
who also produce energy—takes hold.76
But the relative merits of these characterizations are beside
the point. What matters is the emergence of the nomenclature in
the first place and all that it represents in terms of the growing
debates over how the system should evolve—debates that only
stoke the flames of an already spreading wildfire of renewable
energy policy change.
D. System Disruption
Just as possible equity dislocations—that is, translocations in
the distribution of energy system benefits and costs—increase as
the use of renewables spreads, so too do potential disruptions of
the electricity system itself.77 This is true both for the physical grid
as well as the surrounding systems, such as electricity markets,
that support it.78 There is, in short, a self-perpetuating cyclical
73. Id. at 131. See generally Ari Peskoe, Unjust, Unreasonable, and Unduly
Discriminatory: Electric Utility Rates and the Campaign Against Rooftop Solar, 11 TEX. J.
OIL, GAS, & ENERGY L. 211 (2016).
74. Raskin, supra note 70, at 263.
75. See, e.g., KRISTIN RALFF-DOUGLAS, CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N, CUSTOMERS AS GRID
PARTICIPANTS: A FUNDAMENTALLY NEW ROLE FOR CUSTOMERS 3 (2013); Joseph P. Tomain,
The Democratization of Energy, 48 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1125 (2015); Shelley Welton,
Grasping for Energy Democracy, MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018); AL WEINRUB &
ANTHONY GIANCATARINO, TOWARD A CLIMATE JUSTICE ENERGY PLATFORM: DEMOCRATIZING
OUR ENERGY FUTURE 4 (June 2015), http://www.localcleanenergy.org/files/Climate%
20Justice%20Energy%20Platform_June%202015.pdf.
76. Sharon B. Jacobs, The Energy Prosumer, 43 ECOLOGY L.Q. 519, 519 (2016).
77. For a discussion on the issue of integrating renewables into the grid, see JURGEN
WEISS & BRUCE TSUCHIDA, INTEGRATING RENEWABLE ENERGY INTO THE ELECTRICITY GRID:
CASE STUDIES SHOWING HOW SYSTEM OPERATORS ARE MAINTAINING RELIABILITY 4 (2015),
http://info.aee.net/hubfs/EPA/AEEI-Renewables-Grid-Integration-Case-Studies.pdf?t=14400
89933677. See also INT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY AGENCY, RENEWABLE ENERGY INTEGRATION
IN POWER GRIDS: TECHNOLOGY BRIEF 5–6 (2015).
78. See, e.g., Kenneth Rose, Trouble in Market Paradise: Development of the Regional
Transmission Operator, 50 J. ECON. ISSUES 535 (2016).
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relationship not only between renewable energy policies’ success
and equity concerns, but also between that success and disruption
of the system with which those policies interface. The more
successful renewables policies are, the more they give reason for
their own alteration.
This relationship is not just hypothetical. One need not look far
for its evidence. One example: Early RPSs in the United States
typically did not include cost caps. But those features are
relatively commonplace now, specifically because it became clear
that RPSs could affect retail electricity prices, even if modestly.79
Another: Only six years ago, the occasional presence of negative
wholesale electricity prices—prices below zero—that some
European markets saw on particularly cool, windy, sunny days
seemed like the stuff of science fiction.80 Now, similar effects occur
in the United States,81 and serve as a dual-edged argument for
pulling back on policies that promote some renewables, like rooftop
solar, that cannot be readily controlled by system operators. Yet
one more set of examples: Jurisdictions continue to experiment
with how to strike the right balance in bringing facilities online
under PURPA,82 and others, like Germany, have modified their
laws to directly influence where and what kind of renewables are
built.83
The list goes on. The point is simple. As renewable energy
policies become more and more effective, they increasingly disrupt
the systems into which renewables must be integrated, which in
turn further encourages resistance to the policies. In short:
Renewable energy policy success destabilizes itself.
79. See Barbose et al., supra note 59, at 646.
80. Davies & Allen, supra note 5, at 963.
81. Ivan Penn, California Invested Heavily in Solar Power: Now There’s So Much That
Other States Are Sometimes Paid to Take It, L.A. TIMES, June 22, 2017, http://www.la
times.com/projects/la-fi-electricity-solar/.
82. Emily Hammond describes the current state-level changes taking place in PURPA
implementation and use as falling into three key categories: increased reliance by
renewables developers on PURPA as a support mechanism as RPS targets are met; growing
efforts by utilities to reduce PURPA avoided cost rates or alter PURPA contract lengths;
and shifting market dynamics as PURPA-qualifying entities gain access to further options
for selling electricity. See Emily Hammond, The Energy In-Betweens, JURIMETRICS,
(forthcoming 2018) (on file with author); see also Portland Gen. Elec. Co. v. FERC, 854 F.3d
692 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (addressing whether transmission constraints justify limiting PURPA
purchase obligations); Swecker v. Midland Power Coop., 807 F.3d 883 (8th Cir. 2015)
(discussing a variety of changes in state-level PURPA implementations); Exelon Wind 1,
L.L.C. v. Nelson, 766 F.3d 380 (5th Cir. 2014) (addressing whether PURPA purchase
obligations can be confined to “firm” power production); Robert Walton, Idaho Regulators
Reduce PURPA Contracts from 20 to 2 Years, UTILITY DIVE (Aug. 15, 2015),
https://www.utilitydive.com/news/idaho-regulators-reduce-purpa-contracts-from-20-to-2years/404518/.
83. See Bechberger & Reiche, supra note 48, at 34; Lauber & Mez, supra note 48, at 3.
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III. THE FUTURE PATH OF RENEWABLE ENERGY POLICY
Arguably the most perilous endeavor in energy scholarship is
predicting the future. That road is littered with casualties of this
error.84 The same might be said of prophesying the future of
energy law and policy. Just as it was unthinkable in 2000 that
natural gas would come to dominate the landscape of 2018,85 no
one would have thought in 1990 that the nation would be
blanketed with RPSs by 2008. Energy policy futures often are just
as uncertain as energy system futures themselves.
At the same time, it would be anomalous to eulogize the
impending past life of renewable energy policy without looking, in
some way, at what is yet to come. In this connection, two issues are
key: where the policy may head in the short-term, given its current
directions; and what its ultimate path may be in the long-run,
given the many questions that surround its future.
A. Directions
Any effort to describe the overall trajectory of a body of law or
policy inevitably will overlook much of the nuance, particularities,
and distinctiveness that necessarily typify what happens on a
jurisdiction-specific level. Still, it is clear that as a collective
whole, renewable energy policies—both in the United States and
beyond—have begun trending in several common directions.
The most obvious trend is change. Of course, change is always
inevitable, but the change occurring today in renewable energy
policy is remarkable nonetheless. For one, the rate of change is not
only rapid but appears to be increasing. Certainly, the United
States has already experienced this in the continuing amendment
of its states’ RPSs,86 but it seems that now change is becoming
more prominent in PURPA and net-metering regimes as well—not
to mention U.S. jurisdictions’ burgeoning experiments with feed-in
tariffs.87 The trend, moreover, is not limited to the United States.
A recent report by the European Commission documented no
fewer than ninety-nine changes or transitions to the renewable
84. VACLAV SMIL, ENERGY AT THE CROSSROADS: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES AND
UNCERTAINTIES 121 (2003).
85. See generally ROBERT W. KOLB, THE NATURAL GAS REVOLUTION: AT THE PIVOT OF
THE WORLD’S ENERGY FUTURE (2014). For more on the historical role of natural gas in U.S.
society, see Lincoln L. Davies & Victoria Luman, The Role of Natural Gas in the Clean
Power Plan, 49 JOHN MARSHALL L. REV. 325, 327–51 (2015).
86. See Davies, supra note 31, at 64; Carley et al., supra note 37.
87. THE 50 STATES OF SOLAR, supra note 44, at 12, 18.
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electricity support policies of E.U. member states since 1997, with
roughly half of those taking place in the last ten years.88 By itself,
the rate and degree of such changes is notable. It likely portends
the field’s short-term future. But it is also critical because research
has consistently shown that investor certainty is a key to
renewable energy policy success.89 To the extent, then, that this
change is undermining that certainty, it must be managed.90
This is particularly true given that a key direction of the
ongoing change is to make renewable energy policy more marketoriented. Whether that means the future will come full circle to
providing merely a bare minimum “avoided cost” level of support
for renewables as PURPA originally did—forty years ago, in
1978—remains to be seen.91 What is clear, though, is that
integration of market-focused features into renewable policies is
growing almost unabated.92 These are the pushes being made in
the United States for rooftop solar support. They have already
taken hold internationally, in the shift of many feed-in tariffs to
feed-in premiums. And they are the defining feature of many E.U.
states’ recent implementation of auction and tendering schemes in
place of their old policies.93 Even more critical, the pressure to
move toward market-based policies will only continue to grow as
technology costs likewise continue to fall. Given that the levelized
costs of some renewables are already lower than conventional
energy sources,94 further pressure in this direction seems virtually
inevitable.
Another direction of changing renewable energy policy is the
increased hybridity of its tools. Indeed, it is this merging of
mechanisms that has led some commentators to suggest that
reliance on “conventional labels” for renewable energy policies
“may no longer be appropriate.”95 Already, the trend has
88. European Commission Guidance for the Design of Renewables Support Schemes, at
24, COM (2013) 439 final (May 11, 2013).
89. See Felix Mormann, Enhancing the Investor Appeal of Renewable Energy, 42
ENVTL. L. 681, 705, 711–713 (2012); Lincoln L. Davies, Evaluating RPS Policy Design:
Metrics, Gaps, Best Practices, and Paths to Innovation, 4 KLRI J.L. & LEGIS. 3, 33 (2014).
90. For an innovative proposal for managing energy system changes from a property
perspective (i.e., in parallel and relevant contexts), see Christopher Serkin & Michael P.
Vandenbergh, Prospective Grandfathering: Anticipating the Energy Transition Problem, 102
MINN. L. REV. 1019 (2018).
91. See COUTURE ET AL., supra note 1, at 18 (“Avoided cost is emerging as a cost
benchmark.”).
92. See, e.g., Venkatachalam Anbumozhi et al., Market-Based Mechanisms to Promote
Renewable Energy in Asia, ERIA DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES 1 (April 2015), http://www.
eria.org/ERIA-DP-2015-30.pdf.
93. See supra note 49-53, and accompanying text.
94. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 69, at 7–21.
95. See COUTURE ET AL., supra note 1, at 25.
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permeated the policy ecosystem. Nations that long have relied on
feed-in tariffs have, for years now, layered aggregate limits or
aspirational targets—traditionally considered a key feature of
RPSs—on top of those tariffs.96 Jurisdictions increasingly are using
RPSs and feed-in tariffs in tandem, and calls to blend these tools
are growing.97 At the same time, there is no dearth of examples of
jurisdictions adopting policies that look like one thing, but calling
them another (e.g., Australia’s “feed-in tariff,” which really
functions like a net-metering regime)—again, only further
evidence of the increasing hybridity of renewable energy policies
themselves.98 While the ways in which these combinations will
evolve in future years may be far from certain, that the
amalgamation will continue in some form seems almost a given.
B. Questions
As clear as the current directions of renewable energy policy
are, its long-term future is equally as murky. This fog surrounding
renewable energy policy’s future engulfs not just the policy’s
durability—whether and how long it will remain in place—but also
its extent and shape—how deeply the policy will help transform
our energy systems, and the form, structure, and content of the
implementing tools that will be used to do so.
One can imagine many renewable energy futures, each along a
spectrum. At one end, society ultimately arrives at a clean energy
economy: a truly transformed market that is different in kind from
what we have today.99 At the other end of the spectrum, an
economy that looks much like the current one could persist:
renewables play a role and compete in the market, but the existing
focus on cost, above all else, remains.100 Somewhere in between,
there are a variety of altered economies: those where renewables
have assumed more than a toehold and are key aspects of the
market, but remain short of dominant.
The scope of future renewable energy policy itself might well
align with each of these options. Expanded renewable energy
96. See Davies & Allen, supra note 5.
97. See, e.g., Felix Mormann, Clean Energy Federalism, 67 FLA. L. R EV. 1621 (2015);
see also Lincoln L. Davies, Reconciling Renewable Portfolio Standards and Feed-In Tariffs,
32 U TAH ENVTL. L. REV. 311 (2012).
98. See COUTURE ET AL., supra note 1, at 25.
99. See, for example, JOSEPH P. TOMAIN, CLEAN POWER POLITICS: THE
DEMOCRATIZATION OF ENERGY (2017), for more on the transition to a clean energy economy.
100. For more on the path dependencies that may encourage this, see Joseph P.
Tomain, The Dominant Model of United States Energy Policy, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 355
(1990).
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policy support almost certainly is necessary to arrive at a true
clean energy economy, so the extent to which this policy persists—
particularly in how aggressive it is101—may well correlate with the
shape of our renewable energy future.
Likewise, the different clean energy paths have parallels in the
overall shape, or “architecture,” of the future electricity grid. Jan
Beermann and Kerstin Tews, for instance, have envisaged three
possible formulations of that grid, based on the extent to which
it integrates distributed generation and moves toward a new
energy democracy: (1) a “fragmented” system where distributed
resources, microgrids, and localized power parks dominate; (2) an
“accommodating” system that relies on the current grid structure
but allows distributed resources to be used; and, in between, (3) a
“decentralized” system where some central plants continue, but
utilities largely operate transmission and distribution systems
while local and on-site generation grows significantly.102
Of course, nothing suggests that any given version of our clean
energy future must develop in lockstep with any specific iteration
of a future grid configuration. More likely, they will be mixed and
matched—and arrived at piecemeal and in fits, starts, and
stops, with different jurisdictions choosing different paths, both
domestically and globally. Without question, though, one key
driver of both of these futures will be the type, scope, and shape of
renewable energy policy that each jurisdiction chooses.
Increasingly, the literature has begun to address best practices
that should be employed in designing good renewable energy
policy.103 Critically, the details of those best practices today differ,
quite significantly, from what they would have been twenty years
ago. Thus must be taken into account as the renewable energy
policies of the future are written.
Recently, David Jacobs and his coauthors identified three key
parameters under which effective renewable energy policy should
be designed. It should be bankable, flexible, and offer market
101. See, e.g., Haitao Yin & Nicholas Powers, Do State Renewable Portfolio Standards
Promote in-State Renewable Generation?, 38 ENERGY POL’Y 1140 (2010); Miriam Fischlein &
Timothy M. Smith, Revisiting Renewable Portfolio Standard Effectiveness: Policy Design
and Outcome Specification Matter, 46 POL’Y SCI. 277 (2013).
102. Jan Beermann & Kerstin Tews, Decentralised Laboratories in the German Energy
Transition: Why Local Renewable Energy Initiatives Must Reinvent Themselves, 169 J.
CLEANER PROD. 125, 130 (2017).
103. See, e.g., SADIE COX & SEAN ESTERLY, RENEWABLE ELECTRICITY STANDARDS:
GOOD PRACTICES AND DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS (2016); Zeineb Abdmouleh et al., Review of
Policies Encouraging Renewable Energy Integration & Best Practices, 45 RENEWABLE &
SUSTAINABLE ENERGY REV. 249 (2015); Felix Mormann, Requirements for a Renewable
Revolution, 38 ECOLOGY L. Q. 903, 948–57 (2011); European Commission Guidance for the
Design of Renewables Support Schemes, supra note 88.
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participants a long-term vision.104 That is, it should allow for
investors to mitigate risk, while simultaneously allowing for
(ideally, planned) change over time, yet certainty to the market.105
Within this frame, several other lessons have emerged through
experience with existing renewable energy policies that should
guide the content of such support mechanisms going forward.
These might be referred to as renewable energy policy “matching
principles.” Policymakers should:
•

Match policies to technology and market maturity. For
instance, feed-in tariffs might be used for more nascent
technologies, but RPSs or tendering schemes might be
relied on to support more mature technologies.106 Onesize-fits-all is not required.

•

Match policies to the scope of market change sought. It
appears that the aggressiveness of renewable energy
policies can influence the amount of technology that is
deployed.107 Jurisdictions that want a more modest
market change thus should use more modest policies,
and vice versa. Further, understanding, at a very
nuanced level, which design features of a policy drive its
efficacy and efficiency is critical.108

•

Match policies to the type of market change sought.
Often lost in the decades-long debate between renewable energy policy types is the fact that some tools are
better built for different outcomes than others. RPSs, for
instance, inherently rely on leveraging incumbent
utilities to bring more renewables online.109 Netmetering, by contrast, intrinsically aims to upset
utilities’ market position. Policymakers should keep
such differences front and center when choosing
implementation tools, rather than blurring the distinct
issues of how much renewable energy to promote and
who produces that energy.

104. DAVID JACOBS ET AL., RE-TRANSITION: TRANSITIONING TO POLICY FRAMEWORKS
COST-COMPETITIVE RENEWABLES, at i (2016), http://iea-retd.org/wp-content/uploads/
2016/03/IEA-RETD_RE-TRANSITION.pdf.
105. Id. at 26, 47, 55.
106. See Davies, supra note 97, at 344.
107. See supra note 101, and accompanying text.
108. See supra note 101, and accompanying text.
109. See Joel B. Eisen, Residential Renewable Energy: By Whom?, 31 UTAH ENVTL. L.
REV. 339, 366 (2011).
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Match policy trajectory to an aspirational end game. At
this stage of renewable energy policy development, it
would be naïve, at best, to believe that any given
mechanism will remain static in perpetuity. In building
flexibility into their policies, then, lawmakers should
plan, as best they can, for specific end games for their
policies—by, for instance, building into their laws a
sequence of transitions from one policy device to another
as outcome benchmarks are met, or otherwise designing
an express glide path forward.

No doubt, this list of matching principles is not exhaustive, and
lessons about how best to promote renewables only continue to
emerge. Our understanding of these laws, however, including
where they have been and where they may be headed, has never
been greater. It is essential we take advantage of these growing
insights now, without delay.
CONCLUSION
In eulogizing past renewable energy policy, we must pause to
take stock of all that it has offered so far. Without question, it has
helped usher in the remaking of the United States’—and the
world’s—energy systems. Without question, it has fundamentally
altered the nature of electricity markets, including by changing the
participants—and types of participants—in those markets. And
without question, the policy has become more refined—more
multifaceted and sophisticated—than ever before.
But in reaching that new level of sophistication, other lessons
have been laid bare. The renewable energy policy of the past is not
long for this world. It, like the energy systems it seeks to remake,
is rapidly changing—and the new form of policy now emerging is
as different from that of decades ago as its future is uncertain. As
policymakers continue to reinvent this policy—as they continue to
use it to reshape our collective energy future—the importance of
drawing on the many lessons learned to date cannot be
overemphasized.
Certainly, the lesson that stands out above all others is the
very thing giving rise to the eulogy itself. The policy is changing. It
will continue to do so. And a failure by policymakers to carefully
manage that change—balancing the practical need for design
innovation and evolution with the market’s need for stability and
certainty—can only lead to failure of the policy itself.
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